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Extreme Makeover: Art and Morality in Neil LaBute’s The Shape 
of Things (2003) 
 
Joseph H. Kupfer1 
 
The Makeover as Cultural Phenomenon 
The idea of a makeover, especially an extreme makeover, is appealing because 
it suggests that there is always a second chance.  In our discussion of Neil 
LaBute’s 2003 film, three arenas of makeover are especially relevant: the 
makeover in real life, as television spectacle, and the remaking of characters in 
film.  By now, most of us are familiar with the intentional upgrading of 
appearance.  No matter how badly fate has dealt with our looks, experts can 
rework our bodies for the better.  In contemporary society we have gone 
beyond changing hairstyles, makeup, and wardrobe; with plastic surgery, we 
can strengthen a man's jaw, shorten a woman's nose or make a child’s ears less 
obtrusive.  Liposuction and tummy tucks can just as readily change the 
contours of a person's body so that he or she will be more attractive.  Why 
should good looks just be a matter of luck? And individuals try to make 
themselves over through diet, exercise and the skein of self-help books ranging 
from improving finance to meliorating social relationships. 
Seizing the opportunity to market the transformation of ordinary 
people for a media audience, ‘reality’ television has packaged an array of 
makeovers as entertainment.  Sometimes the transformation is relational, as 
in ‘Who Wants to Marry a Multi-Millionaire;’ sometimes the transformation 
is a matter of social standing, as in ‘Charm School.’  Shows that focus on 
upgrades in clothing and outer style include ‘Queer Eye for the Straight Guy’ 
and ‘What Not to Wear.’  More radically still, televised cosmetic surgery 
was provided in ‘The Swan’ (whose brief run ended in 2004).  It seems that 
audiences devour the display of average individuals receiving - without 
particular merit and at the stroke of a magic media wand - a chance to start 
over, better than ever before.  The typical makeover hues to conventional 
norms of beauty, grace and style.  Writing about the show ‘What Not to 
Wear,’ Jennifer Pozner laments that women of diverse backgrounds are 
ridiculed for failing to conform to a single upper-middle-class, traditional 
and feminine standard of fashion and beauty (2010).  
The ur-form of makeover television may well have been ‘Queen for 
a Day,’ which ran from 1956 to 1964.  Some analysts characterize the 
dynamics of this landmark show as one of economic exchange (Weber 
2009).  The female contestants traded their tales of suffering and toil for a 
bevy of prizes that accompanied their transient, regal installation.  The 
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model of economic transaction persists in contemporary makeover shows in 
that participants still pay a price for their transformation, if not with ridicule 
or humiliation, then at least in the coin of public commodification.   
Finally, we have the rendering of makeover in film.  Besides the 
more general second chance themes found in such classics as Groundhog 
Day (1993) and It’s a Wonderful Life (1946), movies have provided an 
assortment of characters who are reshaped outwardly, inwardly or both.  To 
great comic effect, for example, we watch men become more sensitive and 
responsive because they take on the guise of women in Tootsie and Mrs. 
Doubtfire (1993).  A woman becomes more confident and self-possessed as 
she acquires a formal college education in Educating Rita (1983).  And a 
loutish teenage boy grows emotionally and spiritually as a result of his 
romantic friendship with a young woman in the somewhat sappy, but oddly 
effective, A Walk to Remember (2002).   
Two films in particular stand out as precursors to The Shape of 
Things.  The quintessential makeover movie, also originating in the theatre, 
is George Bernard Shaw’s Pygmalion (as well as its musical incarnation on 
stage and screen, My Fair Lady [1964]).  The story is mentioned by Adam 
in The Shape of Things, who addresses his girlfriend (Evelyn) as ‘Henry 
Higgins’ in the course of being similarly refashioned by her.  As with the 
domineering linguist, Evelyn reworks Adam in order to champion a higher 
calling.  Where Higgins is trying to show the power of the science of 
linguistics, Evelyn seeks to exhibit her artistic prowess to ‘sculpt’ a human 
being by means of her persuasive talents.   
The other popular film that is a plausible predecessor of The Shape 
of Things is Pretty Woman (1990).  Instead of the nerdy Adam, we watch 
the attractive, but déclassé, prostitute Vivian Ward upgraded to feminine 
respectability.  Even as Pygmalion of the Greek myth falls in love with his 
beautiful creation, Galatea, (revisited by Higgins and Doolittle), so does the 
wealthy Edward Lewis fall in love with the burnished hooker.  Although 
Evelyn is not taken with the new Adam she has fabricated, her relationship 
with Adam appears at first to be in the Hollywood tradition of romantic 
comedy.  It comes with the standard banter and courtship, watchful and 
rueful friends, and mini-crises.  Many reviewers do construe the film as a 
variation on the time-honored ‘battle of the sexes’ genre.  Frank Ochieng, 
for example, describes the movie as a ‘black comedy relationship piece’ 
(2003, 1394); Dennis Harvey sees it as a ‘queasy investigation of male-
female relations’ (2003, 31); and John Petrakis finds that ‘most of the first 
act resembles a standard romantic comedy’ (2003, 42).  It could easily be 
viewed as a jaundiced elaboration of an earlier film with the Adam-Eve 
overlay - Adam’s Rib.  In that story, Amanda and Adam are married lawyers 
who duke it out in the court room and bedroom with women’s rights and 
power at issue.   
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Commentators are also quick to note how The Shape of Things 
inverts the quasi-romantic subterfuge of LaBute’s earlier  drama-into-film, 
In the Company of Men (1997).  Thus does A.O. Scott describe it as a 
‘curdled parable of sexual cruelty - a kind of gender-reversed variation of 
‘In the Company of Men’’ (2003, 53).  A brief sketch of the structure of that 
earlier work will round out the cultural context of our analysis of The Shape 
of Things.  In the first story, two men plan a sham wooing of some 
unsuspecting, preferably lonely, woman during their abbreviated sojourn at 
a work site away from their company base.  Their avowed aim is to avenge 
the callous treatment they have received from women, thereby restoring ‘a 
little dignity’ for these past injustices as well as giving them something to 
‘fall back on’ in the event of future feminine abuse.   
  Their plan soon pans out as they find a sweet, young deaf woman in 
the offices of their six week assignment.  The competing cads separately 
wine and dine Christine in the expectation of dumping and hurting her.  By 
story’s end, however, things have taken an unexpected turn.  The less 
assertive of the pair, Howard, actually falls in love with Christine, while the 
cocky and aggressive Chad remains aloof and smug.  At the denouement, 
we discover, along with Howard, that Chad had been deceiving him as well 
as Christine.  Chad’s girlfriend had not walked out on him as he had told 
Howard.  She is in fact sleeping in the adjoining bedroom when Howard 
unexpectedly drops in to discuss his feelings for the erstwhile victim. 
The details of In the Company of Men need not concern us.  What is 
relevant here is that Evelyn’s domination of Adam reverses the 
manipulation and cruelty of the men in the former LaBute tale.  From this 
angle, The Shape of Things can be viewed as the woman’s parallel revenge 
story, punishing a man (the original man, Adam) who symbolically stands 
in for all the men who control and exploit women.  A crucial difference 
between the two stories, however, is that Chad and Howard set out to toy 
with Christine’s affections in retaliation for the alleged moral indignities 
visited upon them by women.  But, as Chad confesses, he is really in it for 
the power; he manipulates and hurts Christine, he tells Howard, ‘Because I 
can.’  Evelyn’s avowed aim is art.  Although that could be an excuse for 
asserting her will over Adam or men in general, the story gives every 
indication that Evelyn does care about her art and views herself as an artist. 
Where men deceived and manipulated an innocent young woman in 
LaBute’s earlier movie, Evelyn turns the tables by exercising a similar 
control over a man.  But to leave it at that and understand the film simply in 
terms of an acerbic, female-dominated gender conflict would omit too much 
in the story that needs to be accounted for.  By inscribing a strong moral 
theme within the romantic formula and gender struggle, LaBute actually 
transforms the makeover movie itself, a meta-makeover of sorts.  He does 
so by raising profound questions concerning the relationship between art 
and morality. 
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Art and Morality 
Woven through the story of Evelyn’s ever-encompassing makeover of 
Adam are multi-layered relationships between art and morality.  Among 
these is the relative importance of the moral versus the aesthetic.  One 
traditional and influential way of thinking is to view the moral as taking 
precedence over other domains of value, such as the economic, social, 
personal or artistic.  Yet such elevation of the moral likely needs to be 
qualified.  For surely a small malfeasance or harm, such as a minor lie or 
broken promise, can be justified by a very great economic, personal or 
artistic gain.  We would seem to be warranted in lying about our vacation in 
order to preserve our friendship, for example, or save Rembrandt’s 
‘Nightwatch.’  So, we cannot say in blanket fashion that moral values 
necessarily override all others.  A more tempered, flexible view might be 
that morality takes priority over other considerations unless the other goods 
obviously exceed the moral costs or gains by a decisive margin.   
The Shape of Things encourages us to reflect on the relative 
importance of the moral versus the artistic by virtue of the strong stance 
taken by Evelyn.  She reverses the standard conception, explicitly rejecting 
virtually all moral claims in favor of the creation of art.  One commentator, 
in fact, attributes to LaBute himself the view that art transcends and thereby 
precludes moral concerns.  Nick Schager writes that Evelyn is the film’s 
hero because ‘she’s the only one who accepts Labute’s trite theory that 
‘Moralists have no place in an art gallery’ [proclaimed in a banner at 
Evelyn’s M.F.A. defense]’(2003, 581).  Schager proceeds to argue that ‘the 
film champions the ideas that the nature of art itself-good or bad, mean or 
kind, manipulative or suggestive-is that it is beyond [moral] reproach’ (2003, 
581).  The reviewer thinks that by these means LaBute is trying to defend 
himself against critics who took him to task for the caustic love relations 
depicted in In the Company of Men. 
Although the view that art is beyond the reach of the moral is 
certainly Evelyn’s, why uncritically and simplistically attribute it to LaBute 
or his film? Just as LaBute himself does not, on my understanding, endorse 
the nasty conniving of the men depicted in In the Company of Men, neither 
does he side with Evelyn.  Instead, he provokes us to investigate the multi-
faceted interplay between art and morality.  After all, a film that contains 
the assertion that moralists have no place in an art gallery cannot truly mean 
to exclude moral judgment or value from art upon pain of self-contradiction. 
The numerous literary references that punctuate the story prepare us to see 
narrative as a self-reflexive trope of the film.  These references point to at 
least two things: the importance of the moral content found in particular 
works of art and the moral significance of narrative itself.  Many of the 
literary allusions are made by Adam, as with his Higgins jest, reminding us 
that he is an English major.  Nevertheless, something more seems at stake.  
Consider several of the literary gems that are privileged in the story: The 
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Picture of Dorian Gray. (Wilde), Shakespeare’s Othello, Metamorphosis 
(Kafka), the Medea of Euripides and the biblical account of Adam and Eve.  
Immoral behavior is central to each of these stories, suggesting that moral 
concerns are an inescapable dimension of virtually any narrative.  We will 
explore the moral resonances for The Shape of Things as we analyze the 
film in depth, but a word or two about Genesis might be helpful here. 
  The Garden of Eden may well be the literary locus classicus for the 
battle between the sexes.  With Evelyn’s name naturally heard as an 
elongation of ‘Eve,’ LaBute echoes the biblical story in Evelyn’s control of 
her latter-day Adam.  Taking her cue from God, who created man from clay, 
Evelyn molds her Adam, not in her own image of course, but in the image 
of the man she (allegedly) would like Adam to be - according to her own 
design, so to speak.  As we will see, Evelyn believes that the artist's work is 
divine, beyond considerations of morality.  More patently, Evelyn resembles 
Eve in leading her man astray.  While the Eve of Genesis tempts her Adam 
with fruit from the tree of knowledge, Evelyn manipulates her contemporary 
Adam with her very sensual self.  Evelyn twists and turns and reshapes 
Adam by exciting and controlling his desire for her.   
Each woman works her wiles on the man in order to realize a 
transcendent good.  Evelyn remakes her frumpy Adam for the sake of art, 
just as Eve persuades Adam to disobey God in order to acquire knowledge.  
The parallels include each man’s loss of innocence through self-
consciousness, especially about sexuality, and shame.  Breaking God’s 
commandment and expulsion from paradise, moreover, are obviously 
fraught with moral turpitude.  In a similar vein, Evelyn argues that the 
improvement in Adam’s outward appearance is accompanied by morally 
tainted behaviour. 
The pride that Evelyn shares with the biblical Eve is also informed 
by art in The Shape of Things.  Evelyn’s moral vice has a distinctively 
aesthetic scope in that Evelyn believes her taste in artistic matters is superior 
to everyone else’s.  In the character of Evelyn, then, LaBute has proven 
himself to be an ironic Pygmalion, creating someone who suffers from a 
kind of aesthetic hubris: a vice that is moral but shaped by aesthetic 
perception.   
Narrative is also morally relevant as the implicit framework of 
Evelyn’s scheme to refashion Adam.  We see that Evelyn is imposing her 
narrative of their relationship on Adam, including its status as an art project.  
Even though Evelyn sees herself as a sculptor, using a real person as her 
medium, she works from a narrative of what Adam will become, including 
what their relationship does or does not amount to.  We might consider this 
the pragmatics of narrativity: the narrative dimension of deliberation and 
action.  The narrative of Adam’s makeover which first serves as Evelyn’s 
action-plan will eventually be the substance of her public presentation for 
her M.F.A. project. 
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The pragmatics of narrativity can also have a social component, in 
that Evelyn is simultaneously encouraging Adam to create a more favorable, 
albeit deluded, narrative of his own.  Just as Christine was weaving a 
romantic story (a ‘romance’) of her relationship with Chad in In the 
Company of Men, Chad was orchestrating his narrative of humiliation.  
Relationships can be gauged, then, by the extent to which the stories of the 
people in the relationship jibe or fail to converge.  When the stories diverge, 
moreover, we can ask whether one of the parties is morally responsible for 
the disparity and subsequent painful disillusionment of the other person.  
 Lastly, we have the moral salience of narrative for LaBute’s own work.  
The repeated evocation of narrative in the film suggests that the 
relationships between art and morality might insightfully be interrogated in 
a narrative.  What is needed is a dramatized philosophical investigation, or a 
philosophical drama - what we find in The Shape of Things.  As with Plato’s 
dialogues, LaBute’s drama discloses aspects of the struggle for normative 
supremacy between the moral and the artistic by laying bare the souls of the 
characters in the course of the spoken debate.  LaBute’s drama recalls the 
battle for authority between philosophy and poetry in Plato’s Republic.  
LaBute follows Plato in offering an interrogative work of art, one that 
questions and arouses us to question without providing straightforward 
answers.  As with Plato, rather than taking an explicit stance, LaBute stages 
the contest for predominance, not so much between the sexes, as between 
morality and art. 
To summarize.  Our interpretation of the film explores the 
relationship between art and morality through four themes: the tension 
between artistic and moral values; the moral content of art; the moral vice of 
aesthetic pride; and the moral significance narrative—both Evelyn’s and 
LaBute’s.   
 
The Makeover Artist Snares Her Prey 
The film begins in an art museum with an attractive, artsy-looking girl, 
Evelyn (Rachel Weisz), taking Polaroid photos of a classic, ancient 
sculpture.  This may come to seem ironic, since Evelyn is an experimental 
artist, a devotee of performance art whose idea of sculpting is to reshape a 
human being.  However, Evelyn is anything but a traditional art lover and 
we soon learn of her subversive intentions at the art museum.  From the start, 
Evelyn breaks the rules.  Not only is she taking forbidden photos, but she is 
violating the cordoned space around the sculpture.  We will consider how 
much of the allure for Evelyn in what she does is found in breaking the rules 
and the extent to which the artist’s role includes challenging the prevalent 
moral norms.  
Adam (Paul Rudd), a part-time guard in the museum, scolds her, 
‘You stepped over the line.’  Evelyn replies, ‘That's why I did it.’  ‘You're 
not supposed to do that, or the photos,’ Adam rejoins.  LaBute here situates 
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his film (however temporarily) within the tradition of the romantic comedy.  
The attractiveness of a woman who enjoys violating conventional norms 
will soon be reinforced by another staple of the genre, her fighting with the 
protagonist’s best friend. 
Evelyn deflects Adam’s criticism by thanking him for helping her at 
a video store where he worked, sometime in the past.  Adam had helped her 
find a film version of Oscar Wilde’s The Picture of Dorian Grey.  The first 
reference to literature comes in the form of a movie based on a novel, which 
is itself about a painting.  Evelyn will later argue that as Adam became more 
physically attractive his soul became uglier, just as Wilde’s Dorian Grey 
remains handsome while his portrait morphs to reveal the corruption of his 
character.  Morality provides the focus not only of Wilde’s literary narrative, 
but in the narrative aspect of the painting of Dorian as well.  Casually and 
subtly, LaBute points to the centrality of the moral in the artistic.  Evelyn 
threatens to deface the statue with spray paint because she doesn't ‘like art 
that isn't true.’  The inartistic plaster leaf over the sculpture's genital area 
was added on, by a committee, no less.  Although Evelyn rebels against 
society’s starchy mores, she will reshape Adam into a more conventionally 
attractive male.  In this respect, his makeover fits with what is presented in 
the television spectacles.  
The fig leaf might also allude to classical depictions of Adam and 
Eve covering their sexuality when expelled from the Garden of Eden.  
Having eaten fruit from the tree of knowledge, the pair becomes self-
conscious, including awareness of the sins of the flesh.  Indeed, knowledge 
of what he is capable of doing, particularly to his friends, will later cause 
Adam shame; however, Evelyn seems shameless.  She seems capable of 
rationalizing any action for the sake of art, including videotaping sex with 
Adam.  Evelyn informs Adam that she is ‘just getting started on her M.F.A. 
thesis project.’  The information is the first of several clues that Evelyn 
gives as to what her real interest in Adam is all about.   
Flirting with Adam, Evelyn sows the seeds of the makeover, telling 
him: ‘You're cute.  I don't like your hair.’  When he asks whether he can call 
her, the hook has been properly set and Evelyn begins to reel him in.  As 
with her biblical namesake, Evelyn tempts Adam and undermines his 
innocence.  By the end of the movie he will no longer be the open, trusting, 
and trustworthy person whom we meet and like at the start of the story. 
When Evelyn tells Adam that he can call her, she insinuates that he 
is already somewhat responsible for what is to befall him by questioning 
whether he's allowed to ‘hit on’ patrons.  Adam has himself yielded to the 
temptation to break a museum rule, and Evelyn takes pleasure in his 
compromising the moral high ground at the outset.  Adam walks off looking 
at the inside of his jacket where Evelyn has spray-painted her phone number,  
as though she has branded him her property. 
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Besides linking the film’s characters with the biblical Adam and Eve, 
the dialogue connects the couple to the classical narrative of the sculptor 
and his sculpture.  Calling Evelyn ‘Henry Higgins,’ Adam humbly 
acknowledges that he is playing Eliza Doolittle to Evelyn's linguist Higgins 
in Pygmalion, George Bernard Shaw's modern take on the Greek Myth.  In 
the original story, Pygmalion’s sculpture, Galatea, comes to life, becoming 
human.  In Shaw’s play, Higgins makes over a lower class woman to 
demonstrate his mastery of language and phonetics, as well as the 
predominance of linguistic presentation over social history.  Although fairly 
obvious, the double comparison is illuminating for several reasons, on 
several levels.   
The Greek myth indicates that the artist loves his creation.  
Pygmalion sculpts his beautiful Galatea out of marble only to fall in love 
with her when she comes to life.  Now this can be seen as a form of 
narcissism (yet another Greek myth) because Galatea is the result of 
Pygmalion's talent whereby he has externalized aspects of his own 
personality and imagination.  In the case of Henry Higgins, he is working on 
material that is already human and alive, making Eliza Doolittle over into 
the simulacrum of a lady.  As with Evelyn, Henry is not just playing with 
the outward speech and carriage of Eliza, but with her heart as well.  Yet 
Henry too falls under the spell of his own creation, however much she had 
been formed before he came on the scene.   
We will see that Evelyn is unlike Pygmalion and Henry Higgins.  
She never comes to love the creature into which she molds Adam.  Perhaps 
she is too detached, too cold and calculating.  We can ask whether this is a 
flaw in an artist or a human being.  Nevertheless, Evelyn also resembles 
each of her predecessors.  Like Pygmalion, Evelyn sees herself as sculpting 
and her material is unaware of being worked upon by an artist.  And Evelyn 
is also similar to Higgins, insofar as she reshapes a person, material that 
already has a form and consciousness. 
His mention of Henry Higgins indicates Adam's awareness of what 
Evelyn is doing to him, putting it in the context of a literary narrative.  But, 
noticeably, Evelyn claims not to get the reference.  Evelyn may simply not 
know very much about the history of the literary arts, as she appears to miss 
other literary allusions later in the story.  If she is indeed ignorant, then the 
film may be indicating a shallowness and self-absorption on Evelyn's part.  
Perhaps she is eager to experiment with new art forms but with no 
grounding in the classics or basics.  Is this why the result, the film may be 
asking, seems so contrived and, in the end, nasty?   
On the other hand, Evelyn may be just pretending not to know who 
Henry Higgins is.  But why?  Perhaps to throw Adam off the scent and keep 
him from thinking through the possibility that Evelyn is imitating Henry 
Higgins down to using Adam to prove a point.  Where Higgins 
demonstrates to a colleague that by overhauling a street girl's diction and 
Film-Philosophy 17.1 (2013) 
Film-Philosophy ISSN 1466-4615 304 
elocution he can pass her off as a lady, Evelyn's goal is to display the 
artistry by which she makes Adam into her creation 
 
Moral Fallout: Friendship, Taste, and Conquering the Body 
Sometime later, Evelyn and Adam get together with Adam’s friends, Phil 
(Frederick Weller) and Jenny (Gretchen Mol), at the engaged couple’s 
apartment.  The convivial evening is disrupted when Phil scoffs at the 
unknown individual who spray painted a nude in the museum.  Evelyn 
becomes hostile.  She never admits to the group that she is responsible for 
painting the sculpture, but surely Adam guesses.  Phil is smug about his 
opinion that painting a penis over the plaster leaf is pornographic garbage.  
Evelyn defends the act as making a ‘statement,’ claiming that it cannot be 
pornography since it is not meant to titillate.  When Evelyn says that Phil is 
the ‘obnoxious type,’ he lashes back, asking Evelyn who she thinks she is to 
tell him who he is.  Phil perceptively identifies Evelyn as someone who 
wishes to define people, exactly her project with Adam.   
After telling Adam that he ‘can really pick 'em,’ Phil turns to shoot a 
Nerf-ball and mutters ‘statement’ in a derogatory way.  Evelyn yells, ‘Just 
shut the fuck up,’ and gives Phil a running shove in the back, knocking him 
to the floor.  She barks, ‘Fuck right off.  How would you know!’  Phil 
wonders how Evelyn knew that it was a woman who sprayed the statue.  
Evelyn leaves the apartment of Adam’s friends in a huff, sarcastically 
wishing Jen good luck with Phil.  Phil calls Evelyn a bitch and asks Adam 
whether Evelyn has made him her ‘puppy.’ 
The altercation with Phil indicates that Evelyn can get violent about 
differences of artistic opinion.  Although Phil is as self-assured and 
opinionated as Evelyn, we may be surprised that Evelyn, the artist, is so 
intolerant of views that differ from her own.  The image of her as closed-
minded is soon reinforced, even as she defends art that is itself questioning 
and provocative. After a session of love-making (photographed by Evelyn), 
she asks Adam if he enjoyed the performance art they recently saw.  Adam 
finds the female artist removing her tampon lacking in aesthetic qualities.  
Evelyn defends the performance, saying that ‘it's an expression of herself - 
as an artist, as a person.’  Adam snaps that he ‘got it’ (the point of the 
performance) and defends not liking it: ‘Maybe it's because she was 
painting portraits of her daddy using menstrual blood.’  When Evelyn 
replies that the artist is ‘completely influential,’ Adam argues that it was too 
private, and that ‘it's called theatre, not therapy.’  As with Phil, Evelyn gets 
angry when Adam disagrees with her aesthetic assessment, berating Adam 
for having taste ‘up [his] ass.’   
  The scene calls attention to the moral office and character of the 
artist.  First is the notion that the artist has the responsibility of challenging 
our usual ways of perceiving and conceiving the world.  The view that it is 
morally good to see things afresh is one that Evelyn obviously embraces, 
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evidenced in her defence of the performance artist and in her own protest 
against the phony fig-leaf at the museum.  Society would be impoverished 
without art that pushed us to re-examine the conventional norms and beliefs 
we uncritically accept.  And this is why Evelyn’s own impatience with 
Adam and Phil for challenging her judgment and taste is problematic.  
Surely someone who thinks that art should question our habitual modes of 
seeing and thinking should be open to opposition to her own taste? 
Evelyn’s imperious manner also suggests an intimate connection 
between the moral and the aesthetic in the realm of character: the blending 
of a moral vice with an aesthetic flaw.  She demonstrates an aesthetically  
weighted moral defect - a species of artistic hubris.  An overweening pride 
in her aesthetic taste causes Evelyn to be impatient and harsh with Phil and 
Adam when they dispute her judgment.  What differentiates this vice from 
other forms of pride is its distinctively aesthetic content and consequences, 
as it closes the individual off to values and views at variance with her own.  
To have this moral-aesthetic failing one need not be an artist, since it is an 
overestimation of one’s aesthetic judgment, not one’s artistic ability.   
For another example of such an aesthetic immorality, consider someone 
whose aesthetic appreciation of a story or painting is enhanced by the 
valorization of racism or cruelty in the work.  Indeed, something like this 
animates Chad in In the Company of Men.  Delight in his manipulative 
machinations, a kind of aesthetic design and performance, is augmented by 
the cruelty visited upon his victim, Christine.  LaBute has uncovered and 
homed in on a subtle perversity of human character, one which is a 
compound of moral and aesthetic defect.   
The scene also speaks to the socially entrenched gendered view of 
the mind-body division, what we might call the cultural narrative of woman 
as body.  Disputing critics of LaBute who find him devoid of moral 
perspective, Dawn Keetley argues that the writer-director shares Nathaniel 
Hawthorne’s moral rejection of an enduring phallocentric ideal: to conquer 
nature, emblematized in the (often female) body, for the sake of such higher 
ends as knowledge, perfection or creative power.  Comparing Hawthorne’s 
story ‘The Birthmark’ with The Shape of Things, Keetley claims that 
Evelyn’s makeover of Adam actually attacks the ‘longstanding western 
association of men with transcendence of the body and women with a 
thoroughgoing and sexualized embodiment’ (2010, 17).   
Keetley argues that both LaBute’s Evelyn and Hawthorne’s Alymer 
(a scientist) ‘strive to shape those they pretend to love, and both rather 
disingenuously claim that their motives for experiments… are disinterested’ 
(2010, 18).  The two characters are in fact self-interested, pursuing the 
grandiose dream of transcending the body by bending it to their own 
creative and scientific abilities.  We might incidentally note that this could 
also be a subtext of the many makeover television shows mentioned, namely, 
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that the audience subconsciously vibrates to the possibility of human 
mastery of our all-too fragile flesh. 
If Keetley is correct, then LaBute is inverting the traditional gender 
roles, as illustrated by Hawthorne’s male Alymer.  In doing so, he would 
seem to be saying that the drive to transcend the body in a god-like manner 
is not the exclusive preserve of men.  Here Keetley concedes that the 
conversation about the female artist painting in menstrual blood cuts against 
Evelyn’s rejection of the body in favor of such loftier goals as creative 
expression.  Evelyn’s defense of the artistic use of woman’s sexuality, 
especially secretions, would seem to align her with the body and its 
functions.   
However, Keetley should not so readily compromise or soften her 
claim that Evelyn represents subjugating the body as a display of artistic 
prowess.  Evelyn vehemently defends the female body and its secretions 
qua art, whereas Adam says that it is ‘private.’  As a public exhibit 
woman’s body and blood are, on my interpretation, transformed into 
something else by the power of the artist.  In Keetley’s perspective, they are 
no longer threatening, with their dark forces or with their inevitable decay 
and dissolution.  Evelyn resembles the avant-garde menstrual artist when 
she photographs and films her sexual interactions with Adam.  In both cases, 
the (female) artist has herself symbolically triumphed over the (female) 
body by transforming it into art.  Evelyn persists, therefore, as LaBute’s 
stand-in for all the men who have sought to transcend bodily force and 
limitation by reshaping the (typically female) body.  As Keetley remarks, 
the film consistently figures Evelyn as masculine, associating her explicitly 
with such male characters as Dr. Victor Frankenstein, Henry Higgins, and 
Othello. 
Evelyn and Adam end their argument the way they preceded it, with 
lovemaking.  Evelyn beckons her boy with a crook of her index finger.  She 
has rigged up a video camera to tape their sexual coupling, telling Adam to 
smile into the camera.  We see them through the video lens, Adam smiling 
as Evelyn disappears down by his crotch.  Evelyn is in charge, in every way.  
 A subplot involves the mutual attraction that Adam and Jen have long felt 
for each other but have never acted on.  Adam's makeover and relationship 
with Evelyn make him more attractive to Jen, reminiscent of the hopes of 
the contestants in the various television shows.  Meeting at Jen’s instigation, 
she tells Adam that he is ‘getting cuter by the day,’ and kisses him.  He 
clutches her and returns the kiss.  When Phil later finds out about the 
passionate tryst, he is angry, calling Adam ‘Romeo.’  But Phil seems more 
incensed by Adam’s compliance in changing to suit Evelyn, including 
discarding the corduroy jacket that Phil long despised for a spiffier one.  
Shoving turns to tussling and then wrestling on the ground.  Adam becomes 
physical with his old friends, kissing and fighting, as he metamorphoses.  
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Indeed, he will later allude to Kafka’s novella, telling Evelyn that he has ‘a 
Gregor Samsa thing going,’ yet another narrative reference. 
Adam has lost weight, revamped his hair style, stopped biting his 
nails and replaced his dorky glasses with contact lenses.  Evelyn next 
persuades him to have a nose-job.  Waiting for a consultation with the 
plastic surgeon, Evelyn falsely claims to have had a nose-job herself to ease 
Adam's misgivings.  To Adam’s observation that he can't detect the surgery, 
Evelyn replies, ‘That's the point.’ When Evelyn tells him the surgery is 
cosmetic, not corrective, Adam jokes, ‘Well, if it's cosmetic, maybe I should 
just put some powder on it.’  Evelyn doesn't even smile, let alone laugh, at 
this funny line.  Seemingly without a sense of humour, she is presented as 
taking herself and her art too seriously.  Much avant-garde art, including 
some performance art, has a playful quality - Dadaism being a paradigmatic 
case.  Adam conceals kissing Jen from Evelyn and lies to Phil about the 
surgery, claiming that he had banged his nose accidentally.  As with the 
biblical Adam, the film's character loses innocence about sexuality and 
fidelity, both separately and conjointly.  Why conceal such details unless 
ashamed or embarrassed by them? 
Adam joins Evelyn in a coffee shop, surprised to find Jen there as 
well.  Inviting Jen is part of Evelyn’s staging of the scene.  She makes 
Adam and Jen squirm by revealing that she knows about their kiss, having 
talked with Phil.  Evelyn says that she ‘kissed Phillip, to get even.’  After 
Jen leaves in a huff, Adam becomes self-righteous, criticizing Evelyn for 
her treatment of Jen.  Evelyn says that she only kissed Phil for the effect.  
‘For the effect’ could well be Evelyn's mantra, as it often motivates her 
actions: crossing the cordoned line at the museum, spray painting the statue, 
and orchestrating Adam's extreme makeover.  Evelyn proceeds to defend 
her behavior by going on the attack, scolding Adam for lying about his nose 
job.   
Evelyn then changes gears and asks Adam if he's tired of her, 
presumably for kissing Jenny.  Adam tosses out another literary allusion that 
appears to escape Evelyn.  He says, ‘Next you're gonna tell me that the 
handkerchief with the strawberries is missing.’  Recall that Desdemona 
drops such a handkerchief later used by Iago to sow seeds of jealousy in 
Othello, her husband.  Ever the master manipulator, Iago wishes to destroy 
the relationships Othello enjoys with Desdemona and his lieutenant, Cassio 
- just as Evelyn comes between Adam and his best friends.  However, in his 
reference, Adam is implying that Evelyn is becoming jealous of Adam’s 
affection for Jen, as though she were Othello (and not Iago).  But Evelyn is 
merely feigning jealousy for effect, putting Othello’s fatal passion to an 
Iago-like use. 
Adam then yields all power to Evelyn, saying: ‘I'll do anything you 
want... I don't want to lose you... I love you.’  Adam unhappily but readily 
accedes to Evelyn’s demand that he give up Phil and Jen as friends.  Her 
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control of him is complete.  Adam has changed his appearance for Evelyn 
and now has exchanged his dearest friends for her, at her command. Instead 
of wielding a sculptor's chisel, like Pygmalion, Evelyn manipulates her 
living material in the manner of Iago, using desire and fear of loss as her 
primary tools. 
Makeover Revealed and Art Justified 
Phil and Adam meet awkwardly before Evelyn’s presentation of her M.F.A. 
project, and Adam learns that Jen has called off the wedding.  Phil says, 
‘The ring's off.  Took her CDs back.’  People are gathered in a darkened hall 
and Evelyn comes into the spotlight.  Reversing Jen’s removal of her 
engagement ring, Evelyn puts on a diamond ring and disingenuously 
informs the audience that she will soon have an answer for her suitor.  
Adam looks on, eagerly, expectantly, little suspecting that the declined 
marriage proposal will be the final touch of his total humiliation.   
Evelyn then tells the audience that her project is a human sculpture 
that she has worked on for eighteen weeks.  She has purposely left the piece 
untitled because she hopes it will mean something different to each person.  
The sculpture involves two materials of choice: human flesh and human will.  
Evelyn’s challenge was to instill a certain amount of change without 
compromising Adam's free will.  She says, ‘I found that with the right 
coaxing… I could hone the inside of my sculpture as well as the surface.’  
Evelyn stresses that as Adam became more attractive his actions became 
morally suspect, such as kissing his friend's fiancee and then renouncing 
both these friends. 
  At these revelations, first Jen, and then Phil, leave in disgust.  
LaBute employs the surprise revelation in both his films of emotional 
subterfuge.  Besides providing a sudden jolt, the device situates the viewer 
in the same dramatic space as the characters who are victims of Evelyn’s 
manipulation, producing an immediate identification with these characters, 
however temporary.  The film thus engages in a parallel manipulation of us, 
perhaps to strengthen our moral response, but possibly simply to 
demonstrate its power.  Cinema is itself an art form, capable of reshaping its 
audience in diverse ways. 
  Evelyn’s project consists in a variety of ingredients.  Besides the 
outward and inward alterations she has wrought in Adam, it also includes 
the methods she used, and a collection of artefacts such as Adam’s old 
corduroy jacket.  As with the standard makeover show, Evelyn presents 
before and after photos of Adam.  He finally storms off when Evelyn says 
that she cannot accept his offer of marriage.  She concludes by solemnly 
intoning, ‘There is... only art.’  Affirming that the values and claims of art 
take precedence over all others, upends the traditional view outlined in 
Section I: the presumption in favor of moral values over the demands of 
prudence, economics, society or art. 
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As mentioned, the film operates on several levels with regard to the 
relationship between art and morality.  First, there is the moral content of art.  
The movie playfully shows how Evelyn’s own behavior and narrative 
account of that behavior undermine her proclamation that ‘moralists have no 
place in an art gallery.’  Even in the extreme examples offered by Evelyn, 
art addresses morality.  For instance, when she spray paints the vulgar 
plaster leaf covering the statue’s sex organs, Evelyn claims to be making a 
statement - condemning the bourgeois morality that is offended by nudity.  
Clearly, morality falls within the purview of art and artistic protest in 
Evelyn’s own performance.  Evelyn also includes moral content in the 
narrative of her human sculpture, noting that as Adam became more 
outwardly attractive, his behaviour became ‘more [morally] questionable.’  
He violates bonds of friendship by kissing Jen, is deceptive about the 
violation, and lies about his nose job.   
Then, too, Evelyn attempts to defend her human sculpting on moral 
grounds, saying that she never ‘forced’ her subject to do anything, 
illustrating a second relationship between the moral and the artistic: the 
moral status of the means used to create the art.  Although she boasts that 
there is only art, Evelyn seems to be accepting moral limits to the artist’s 
actions.  Yet Evelyn’s argument in her own defence, moreover, is on ground 
as shaky as the justification offered by the devious men of In the Company 
of Men.  Her defence that she did not force Adam to do anything is 
unconvincing.  Does she think that force requires putting a gun to Adam’s 
head or drugging him?  Evelyn has knowingly deprived Adam of agency—-
the moral capacity of self-governance.  Evelyn uses manipulation, deception 
and finally coercion: threatening loss of her love unless Adam severs his 
friendships with Jen and Phil.  As a violation of autonomy, such behavior is 
typically grouped with force as wrongful unless strong countervailing moral 
reasons exist.  The film asks us to consider whether creating art is important 
enough to override the moral strictures against depriving individuals of 
agency. 
The question of whether the production of art can justify otherwise 
immoral behavior has a provocative philosophical pedigree.  Michael Slote 
(1983) and Bernard Williams (1982) before him argue that sometimes an 
action that appears to be immoral can turn out to be morally justified 
because of the salutary consequences of the act.  Both Slote and Williams 
offer Gauguin as an instructive example, arguing that abandoning his wife 
and children was justified by the fact that he produced great art.  
Presumably, the art would not have been created had he honoured his moral 
commitments to wife and children.  These philosophers weigh the apparent 
immorality of Gauguin’s domestic betrayal against its aesthetic fruits, and 
arrive at a moral conclusion - one which exonerates the artist from 
wrongdoing.   
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Williams and Slote compare the obvious immorality of an act with 
its (ultimate) aesthetic payoff and then reach a moral judgment, as if the 
aesthetic possessed moral worth.  Although this is not identical with the 
modest interpretation of Eveyln’s position, that art takes priority over the 
moral (or at least the conventional morality exemplified in covering the 
genitalia of statues), it is certainly of a piece with it.  On the philosophical 
view used to defend Gauguin, Evelyn’s mistreatment of Adam would be 
morally justified just in case her art is worthwhile.  
The Shape of Things prompts us to consider whether this is true, but 
not necessarily to accept its veracity.  Of course there looms the slippery 
slope.  How far would Williams or Slote go before condemning Gauguin’s 
behaviour as wrongful? Would they countenance mutilation or murder for 
the illustrious Gauguin, or family abandonment for a painter who achieved 
less? In Evelyn’s case, even if her quasi-performance art is praiseworthy, 
would it justify maiming or killing Adam? These sorts of casuistical 
questions should make us wonder how weighing the moral against the 
aesthetic is supposed to proceed. 
Slote and Williams seem to be offering a utilitarian argument in 
support of Gauguin.  For the utilitarian, all values and disvalues are to be 
aggregated and then compared.  If the overall utility of the act outweighs its 
disutility (and the net gain of alternative acts), the act is the morally correct 
choice.  As such aggregation and calculation encompass all goods, including 
the artistic, no incommensurability between the moral and the aesthetic 
should arise.  Nevertheless, the old vexing questions return within the 
utilitarian perspective.  How to weigh the harm done to Adam against the 
value of Evelyn’s artistic project?  The film implies that we viewers are in 
the same situation as the audience for Evelyn’s concluding presentation: left 
to rely, in the end, on our own sense of moral boundaries, boundaries to 
which Evelyn herself appeals. However, we should be skeptical about 
comparing the relative values of the artistic and the moral in the first place, 
at least when the immorality involves grievous violations of personal 
agency or well-being.  What of all the would-be Gauguins who betrayed 
their domestic responsibilities or otherwise did serious wrong for the sake of 
their art but were artistic flops? Surely their actions were wrong and just as 
surely were Gauguin’s as well.  His artistic talent did not justify his conduct; 
rather, we are glad he did the wrong thing, in retrospect, because we are 
happy to have his art.  If we are persuaded that Gauguin is off the moral 
hook, it is because we confuse aesthetic appreciation after the fact with 
moral justification of the act. 
To see the error of thinking that Gauguin’s artistic success 
exonerates him from wrong-doing, consider a hypothetical case:  an armed 
robber knocks Jones unconscious and takes his wallet.  Jones is brought to a 
hospital to treat his concussion and, as a result, cannot go to work at the 
Twin Towers on the day they are decimated.  His life is spared because of 
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the robber’s actions; however, this does not justify the robber’s behavior.  
The injury was just a lucky ‘break,’ in no way removing the stain of wrong-
doing from the assailant.  The rightness or wrongness of an act cannot 
depend on accidental features of circumstances.  If it did, then the reverse of 
the Jones case would also be true.  If we saved someone from drowning and 
he subsequently murdered ten people, our act would have been wrongful.  
Such a conclusion seems dubious, at best. 
In cases of truly magnificent art, such as Gauguin’s, we are tempted to 
exculpate the artist from wrong-doing but only because we have confused a 
fortunate outcome with a justification for wrong action.  We can appreciate the 
art without pronouncing every act that was necessary for it morally permissible.  
Evelyn’s justification for violating Adam’s autonomy and causing him 
emotional pain, therefore, should be unconvincing even if her art were 
wonderful.  
 
Narrative and Morality 
Let us conclude by returning to narrative as a trope and the relevance of 
morality to it.  In Section II we broached the idea that LaBute is urging us to 
scrutinize the narrative that Evelyn imposes on Adam and his friends.  The 
morally questionable nature of Evelyn’s narrative is most palpable and 
glaring simply on the grounds of deceit, manipulation and the ensuing harm.  
She leads Adam on and leads him to believe that they have a future together, 
so much so that Adam offers Evelyn his grandmother’s engagement ring 
only to be devastated at Evelyn’s public revelation.  With the help of 
Keetley’s analysis, we can criticize Evelyn’s narrative from a still broader 
perspective.  Keetley’s analysis implies that Evelyn is re-enacting a more 
pervasive and enduring cultural narrative: the narrative of subduing the 
body by subjecting it to our transformative talents.   
Quite apart from the harm done to Adam, then, Evelyn’s narrative of 
extreme makeover is damaging from a cultural point of view.  It diminishes 
our connection with and respect for our bodies - the celebration of ourselves 
as embodied beings.  Evelyn’s M.F.A. project is not simply Adam’s 
makeover.  It is the makeover and Evelyn’s account of it, the narrative she 
offers during the climactic scene of the film.  Without the meaning supplied 
by such a narrative, the changes wrought in Adam would be little more than 
a series of brute facts.  They require a narrative to have significance.  
Although Evelyn thinks that her project is a transgressive piece of 
performance art, Keetley’s view suggests that it is actually regressive, 
merely inverting the oft-told fantasy of male dominance over human form. 
But if we are to come away from the movie suspicious of Evelyn’s narrative 
in both the personal and cultural spheres, we may perhaps take heart from 
the moral upshot of the narrative implications of the film as a whole.  Recall 
how LaBute’s story positions us in the same narrative space that Evelyn 
places Adam and his friends.  The cinematic structure of The Shape of 
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Things thereby renders imminent Evelyn’s narrative of the power of art.  
Disclosing the claims and dangers of art in their immediacy, the film 
harkens us to Plato’s warning about the persuasive charms of narrative.  By 
focusing on the artist as creator of illusion, LaBute calls attention to the 
artifice in art, especially narrative, in a way he did not in In the Company of 
Men.  At the same time, of course, LaBute is himself presenting a different 
sort of narrative within which the relationships between art and morality are 
interrogated.  The adroitness of LaBute is to have raised these normative 
questions within a work of art, by fashioning a philosophical narrative that 
provokes reflection rather than supplying ready answers.   
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